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INTRODUCTION 
he ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus of Ephesus famously 
stated: “Nothing endures but change.”1 Presumably, Heraclitus 
did not have the NCAA enforcement process in mind when he uttered 
those words. Still, his words capture the Association’s repeated 
attempts during the past several decades to tweak that much-maligned 
process in response to the complaints of its members and the critiques 
of outside commentators.2 
 
 Professor, Vermont Law School; J.D., Indiana University-Bloomington, 1987; Ph.D. 
(Political Science), Miami University (Ohio), 1979; B.A., University of Rhode Island, 
1974. 
1 BARTLETT’S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 64 (Justin Kaplan ed., 17th ed. 2002). 
2 I have been one of the critics of the NCAA’s enforcement process, most recently in 
BRIAN L. PORTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NCAA: THE CASE FOR LESS 
COMMERCIALISM AND MORE DUE PROCESS IN COLLEGE SPORTS (2012). 
T
PORTO (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2014  1:11 PM 
1058 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92, 1057 
Present circumstances are no exception to the seemingly perpetual 
state of flux for NCAA enforcement. In mid-November, 2013, at a 
meeting of the presidents of the member institutions belonging to the 
five major athletic conferences,3 change to the enforcement process 
was in the air.4 Said University of Nebraska Chancellor Harvey 
Perlman, the Big Ten Conference’s representative to the meeting, 
“[t]he enforcement mechanism is flawed. . . . I think some attention 
needs to be given to it. I don’t think it can continue in its current 
form.”5 Echoing that sentiment, PAC-12 Commissioner Larry Scott 
told a reporter that NCAA-member institutions must ask “some hard 
questions” about what Scott called the “jury of your peers” model of 
enforcement, whereby employees of those institutions judge their 
peers who allegedly violate Association rules and punish the guilty 
parties.6 Commissioner Scott added that the members have discussed 
the possibility of the NCAA “outsourcing enforcement . . . . I’d say 
we’re only at the idea stage,” Scott added, “and not very far along. . . . 
We’re looking carefully at involving outside resources. I’m sure that’s 
something that will be considered.”7 
The motivation for the potential “outsourcing” of NCAA 
enforcement is presumably the Association’s performance in two 
recent cases of rules violations by member institutions, specifically 
Penn State and the University of Miami. The Penn State case was so 
unusual as to be unprecedented because it involved neither a violation 
of a specific NCAA rule nor wrongdoing by an athlete. Instead, it 
arose from numerous incidents of child sexual abuse committed, 
during a period of years and often in Penn State athletic facilities, by 
former assistant football coach Jerry Sandusky.8 
The NCAA’s response was unusual, too; the penalties it imposed 
on Penn State “resulted not from the usual NCAA enforcement 
 
3 The Big Ten, Big 12, PAC 12, Atlantic Coast (ACC), and Southeastern (SEC) 
conferences are presently the wealthiest and most prestigious conferences in college 
sports. George Schroeder, Big 5 Leagues Want Flexibility but to Remain in NCAA, USA 
TODAY (Dec. 11, 2013, 8:16 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/12 
/11/ big-5-conferences-img-intercollegiate-athletics-forum/3993327/. 
4 Pete Thamel, College Sports Leaders Say Major NCAA Overhaul Imminent, SI.COM 
(Nov. 11, 2013, 4:48 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/college-football/news/ncaa-over 
haul/. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Brian L. Porto, Can the NCAA Enforcement Process Protect Children from Abuse in 
the Wake of the Sandusky Scandal?, 22 WIDENER L.J. 555, 555–56 (2013). 
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process, but instead from reliance by the Association’s president, in 
conjunction with its Division I Board of Directors, on an investigative 
report [the Freeh Report] produced by a private law firm that Penn 
State had hired rather than by the NCAA itself.”9 The criticisms 
leveled at the NCAA in the wake of the Penn State case, then, did not 
attack the Association’s enforcement process, but rather, the hubris of 
Association President Mark Emmert and the Division I Board of 
Directors in bypassing that process and imposing penalties themselves 
based on the Freeh Report.10 These criticisms also voiced “concern 
that the ad hoc procedure the NCAA used in the Penn State case 
would become the Association’s standard enforcement process, or at 
least its established emergency model, in the future.”11 
But the potential appeal of outsourcing NCAA enforcement derives 
not only from a fear that the Association will abandon its established 
enforcement process again, but also from dissatisfaction with that 
process, as reflected in the recent case against the University of 
Miami.12 Lacking subpoena power, an NCAA investigator, who was 
looking into allegations that a Miami booster had showered Hurricane 
athletes with benefits that violated NCAA rules, became frustrated by 
his inability to persuade reluctant witnesses to cooperate with his 
investigation.13 To compensate for his own lack of subpoena power, 
the investigator arranged with Nevin Shapiro’s bankruptcy attorney 
for her to depose the uncooperative witnesses in connection with the 
bankruptcy proceeding and share their testimony with the NCAA.14 
That arrangement, which came to light months later, after the 
investigator had left the NCAA, was contrary to NCAA protocols and 
to the express advice that the Association’s legal staff had given to the 
investigator.15 The revelation prompted NCAA President Mark 
Emmert to suspend the Miami investigation pending completion of a 
 
9 Id. at 556. 
10 Id. at 556–57. 
11 Id. at 557. 
12 Chip Patterson, NCAA Investigating Enforcement After Misconduct in Miami Case, 
CBSSPORTS.COM (Jan. 23, 2013, 1:21 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball 
/eye-on-college-football/21604536/ncaa-investigating-enforcement-program-after              
-misconduct-in-miami-case. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
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separate inquiry into the enforcement staff’s performance in the 
Miami case.16 
The aggregate fallout from the Penn State and Miami cases 
undoubtedly spurred Dr. Emmert’s decision to retain Kenneth 
Wainstein, a partner with the law firm of Cadwalader, Wickersham & 
Taft, LLP, to look into the NCAA’s botched investigation of Miami.17 
According to Chuck Smrt, a former NCAA investigator who now 
assists universities with NCAA rules compliance, the hiring by the 
NCAA of an outside entity to investigate a claim of misconduct by 
the enforcement staff was unprecedented.18 In the past, the 
Association had always used its own employees to conduct such 
investigations.19 Smrt observed, “What is different it seems here, is 
that Dr. Emmert believes the severity of whatever alleged impropriety 
occurred reached that level where he decided to go outside with the 
review.”20 
Despite the fallout from the Penn State and Miami cases, it is ironic 
that the NCAA enforcement process is under scrutiny again at this 
writing because a major revision of that process took effect as 
recently as August 1, 2013.21 That revision followed on the heels of a 
“Presidential Retreat” held during the summer of 2011, when 
approximately fifty university presidents and chancellors gathered to 
address several important issues confronting college sports.22 The 
Division I Board of Directors, an eighteen-member body comprised 
of university presidents, conference commissioners, and directors of 
athletics, established five “working groups,” each one chaired by a 
college or university president, to draft NCAA legislation.23 One of 
the five groups was the Enforcement Working Group, which, 
according to one recent commentary, “substantially revamped the 
 
16 George Schroeder, NCAA to Launch External Review of Enforcement Program, USA 
TODAY (Jan. 24, 2013, 12:46 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2013/01 
/23/ncaa-external-review-enforcement-university-of-miami-fla/1858857/. 
17 Review Launched of Enforcement Surrounding Miami Investigation, NCAA.COM 
(Jan. 23, 2013, 1:43 PM), http://www.ncaa.com/news/ncaa/article/2013-01-23/review        
-launched-enforcement-surrounding-miami-investigation. 
18 Schroeder, supra note 16. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 New Violation Structure, NCAA.ORG (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.ncaa.org/about 
/resources/media-center/news/new-violation-structure. 
22 Timothy Davis & Christopher T. Hairston, NCAA Deregulation and Reform: A 
Radical Shift of Governance Philosophy?, 92 OR. L. REV. 77, 79 (2013). 
23 Id. at 78–79. 
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NCAA enforcement and infractions process.”24 The major changes 
include (1) increasing the number of categories of violation from two 
to four; (2) expanding the membership of the Committee on 
Infractions (COI); and (3) toughening the consequences for coaches 
who fail to direct their staffs and athletes to follow NCAA rules.25 
Despite the recent changes to the NCAA’s enforcement process, 
dissatisfaction persists in the wake of the investigatory missteps in the 
Miami case, as evidenced by the comments quoted earlier regarding 
the process being “flawed” and the need to bring “outside resources” 
to bear in improving it.26 The dissatisfaction centers not on the 
categorization of violations or the nature of penalties, which were the 
focus of the August 2013 reforms, but instead, on who investigates 
and adjudicates alleged infractions of NCAA rules. One journalist 
reflected such dissatisfaction when he asked, “Why not outsource the 
entire enforcement operation to a third party?”27 
Part I of this Article will briefly describe the workings of the 
NCAA enforcement process before the August 2013 changes. Part II 
will examine the Miami investigation, which was conducted under the 
pre-August 2013 rules and which has surely contributed to the present 
dissatisfaction with NCAA enforcement. Part III will outline the 
recent changes in more detail than they are discussed above, and Part 
IV will present a plan whereby the NCAA would delegate 
investigations and adjudications of “severe” (Level I) and 
“significant” (Level II) violations of NCAA rules to outside 
investigators and judges. Finally, Part V will conclude that, although 
the recent changes to the NCAA enforcement process are generally 
positive, they overlook the need for fair, independent investigation 
and adjudication. This Article will recommend a plan designed to 
meet these needs. 
 
24 Id. at 80. 
25 Stuart L. Brown, Mark Jones & Carrie R. McCaw, New NCAA Division I 
Enforcement Model, ICEMILLER LEGAL COUNS. (Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.icemiller 
.com/ice-on-fire-insights/publications/the-ncaa-infractions-enforcement-process-role-of-c/. 
26 Thamel, supra note 4. 
27 Stewart Mandel, NCAA Needs to Reevaluate Entire Enforcement Model, SI.COM 
(Feb. 18, 2013, 8:22 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/college-football/news/20130218 
/ncaa-miami-investigation-julie-roe-lach/. 
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I 
NCAA ENFORCEMENT BEFORE AUGUST 2013: A BRIEF 
RETROSPECTIVE 
The NCAA, a voluntary association comprised of more than 1200 
public and private four-year colleges and the athletic conferences to 
which those colleges belong, is the primary regulatory body in college 
sports.28 It “regulates athletic competition among its members” (e.g., 
establishing game rules, eligibility standards for athletes, and lengths 
of competitive seasons), “conducts several dozen championship 
events in the sports sanctioned by the association, enters into 
television and promotional contracts relating to these championship 
events, and enters into agreements to license the NCAA name and 
logos.”29 
The NCAA’s regulatory role also encompasses investigating 
allegations of rules violations, adjudicating disputes arising from 
those allegations, and penalizing guilty parties.30 The Association 
established its first enforcement program in 1948 to address recruiting 
violations, and in 1951, it established the COI, which still exists, to 
investigate allegations and adjudicate cases against alleged rules 
violators.31 In 1973, the NCAA’s in-house enforcement staff took 
control of the investigations, while the COI concentrated on 
conducting hearings and deciding cases.32 The close working 
relationship between the investigators and the adjudicators led to 
charges that the NCAA had an unfair “home-court advantage” over 
accused parties in its COI hearings, which produced a high 
“conviction” rate for the Association, but denied even a reasonable 
facsimile of due process to accused individuals and institutions.33 Of 
the relationship between the enforcement staff and the COI, one 
commentator stated: “The same people [who] investigate cases serve 
as staff support for the committee that must eventually rule on the 
quality and outcome of those investigations. It’s as if the police 
officer [who] arrested you also clerked for the judge [who] tried 
you.”34 
 
28 Maureen A. Weston, NCAA Sanctions: Assigning Blame Where it Belongs, 52 B.C. 
L. REV. 551, 559 (2011). 
29 RAY YASSER ET AL., SPORTS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 2–3 (6th ed. 2006). 
30 Weston, supra note 28, at 563. 
31 PORTO, supra note 2, at 100. 
32 Id. at 101. 
33 Id. 
34 DON YEAGER, UNDUE PROCESS: THE NCAA’S INJUSTICE FOR ALL 131 (1991). 
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The enforcement process operated under a “cooperative principle,” 
whereby the NCAA expected the enforcement staff and the accused 
institution to work together to determine whether the latter had indeed 
violated one or more Association rules.35 But in 1978, Burton Brody, 
a professor of law at the University of Denver and its faculty athletic 
representative to the NCAA, told a congressional subcommittee 
investigating the Association’s enforcement process that the 
cooperative principle was a euphemism.36 He testified that NCAA 
investigations were “cooperative only in the same sense ancient 
Rome’s system of capital punishment was cooperative—the 
condemned is expected to carry his cross to the crucifixion.”37 
Referencing the investigation of his own institution by the NCAA 
some years earlier, Professor Brody characterized the enforcement 
process as follows: “It is at best a burlesque of fairness. No evidence 
was presented; only the conclusions of staff members. No witnesses 
were called. The only ‘testimony’ was by the enforcement staff 
member, without oath, stating the rankest sort of mixture of hearsay 
and opinion as part of his prosecutorial arguments.”38 
Although the congressional subcommittee declined to impose any 
particular reforms on the NCAA, concluding that self-reform was 
both “possible and preferable,” its majority report was highly critical 
of the enforcement process, especially “the appearance of an 
‘inescapable relationship’ between infractions committee members 
and the prosecutorial enforcement staff, giving rise to an unbeatable 
‘home court advantage.’”39 And although the NCAA declined to 
adopt most of the recommendations offered in the majority report,40 
 
35 PORTO, supra note 2, at 101. 
36 SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS, H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE & 
FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., REP. ON ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM OF THE NATIONAL 
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION 14 (Comm. Print 1978) [hereinafter REP. ON 
ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM] (statement of Burton Brody). 
37 PORTO, supra note 2, at 104 (citation omitted). 
38 RICHARD HARP & JOSEPH MCCULLOUGH, TARKANIAN: COUNTDOWN OF A REBEL 
159 (1984). 
39 REP. ON ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM, supra note 36, at 32; see also Ronald J. 
Thompson, Due Process and the National Collegiate Athletic Association: Are There Any 
Constitutional Standards?, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1651, 1656 (1994). 
40 The subcommittee’s recommendations that the NCAA did not adopt included: (1) 
creating a new entity to supervise the enforcement staff during investigations; (2) hiring a 
fulltime clerk, preferably a lawyer, to draft an opinion explaining the outcome and the 
underlying reasoning in each enforcement case; (3) establishing evidentiary standards by 
which to judge the accuracy of information presented during COI hearings; (4) ending the 
practice of conducting ex parte interviews with sources who made allegations against 
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at its annual convention in 1979, it approved “proposals to let persons 
accused of infractions be represented by counsel at hearings before 
the COI, establish evidentiary standards for those hearings, and set a 
time limit for reviewing alleged violations (i.e., a statute of 
limitations).”41 Still, the NCAA’s rejection of the bulk of the 
subcommittee’s suggestions prompted a steady stream of journalistic 
and academic criticism of the enforcement process as being unfair to 
accused individuals and institutions, which continued long after the 
gavel came down on the 1978 hearings.42 
Indeed, the criticism continued even after the NCAA won a major 
victory against its critics in 1987,43 when the United States Supreme 
Court held that the Association was not a “state actor” within the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.44 The Court reasoned that the 
NCAA had not violated the Constitution in trying to remove Jerry 
Tarkanian from his coaching position at UNLV because, as a private 
entity, it was not required to meet constitutional standards of due 
process.45 Evidently, the NCAA heard the critics because in 1991 it 
appointed a committee chaired by former Solicitor General Rex Lee 
(who had argued the NCAA’s case against Jerry Tarkanian in the 
Supreme Court) to evaluate its enforcement process and adopted 
several of the Lee Committee’s recommendations for enhancing due 
process in enforcement proceedings.46 
Specifically, at its 1993 national convention, the NCAA 
established 
 
individuals and institutions; (5) opening COI hearings not just to accused institutions, but 
anyone whose eligibility or employment was at risk because of the enforcement 
proceedings; (6) narrowing the scope of appeals from reconsideration of the evidence to 
just reviewing possible errors by the COI in determining culpability or in imposing a 
penalty; (7) ending the practice of institutions suspending coaches or declaring athletes 
ineligible at the NCAA’s behest, replacing it with direct imposition of sanctions by the 
NCAA itself; and (8) eliminating the NCAA’s “restitution rule,” which enabled the 
Association to punish individuals and institutions retroactively “if and when court actions 
are ultimately resolved in favor of the NCAA.” PORTO, supra note 2, at 106–08 (quoting 
REP. ON ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM, supra note 36, at 51); see generally REP. ON 
ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM, supra note 36. 
41 PORTO, supra note 2, at 109; see also HARP & MCCULLOUGH, supra note 38, at 171. 
42 See, e.g., C. Peter Goplerud, III, NCAA Enforcement Process: A Call for Procedural 
Fairness, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 543 (1991); YEAGER, supra note 34. 
43 See, e.g., Robin J. Green, Note, Does the NCAA Play Fair? A Due Process Analysis 
of NCAA Enforcement Regulations, 42 DUKE L.J. 99, 109–10 (1992). 
44 See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 192–99 (1988). 
45 Id. 
46 PORTO, supra note 2, at 147. 
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(1) a preliminary notice of impending investigation (NOI); (2) a 
summary disposition procedure in certain cases of major rules 
violations; (3) an appellate body, the IAC [or Infractions Appeals 
Committee]; (4) a mechanism for expanded public reporting of COI 
decisions; and (5) a conflict-of-interest policy for members of the 
NCAA’s enforcement staff.47 
The Association also approved the use of tape recorders by its 
investigators when interviewing witnesses, and required those 
investigators to provide to accused institutions and individuals 
“reasonable access to pertinent information, including tape recordings 
of interviews and documentary evidence.”48 
Despite this progress, criticism of the NCAA enforcement process 
continued. Indeed, 
even after the Supreme Court, in Tarkanian, had absolved the 
NCAA of any duty to provide due process in its enforcement 
proceedings, the Association continued to feel pressure from several 
quarters to enhance the fairness of those proceedings voluntarily. 
That pressure continued through the 1990s and into the new 
millennium, and it included a hearing held by the House Judiciary 
Committee’s Subcommittee on the Constitution in September 
2004.49 
In 1991, two members of the House of Representatives introduced 
bills to overrule the Supreme Court’s Tarkanian decision and to 
require the NCAA to adopt stricter due process protections for the 
institutions and individuals against whom the NCAA brought 
enforcement proceedings. Edolphus Towns (D-NY) introduced H.R. 
2157, the Coach and Athlete’s Bill of Rights.50 This legislation 
“would have reversed the Tarkanian decision by requiring the NCAA 
to provide due process protection to any institution, coach, or athlete 
whom it investigated for allegedly violating Association rules.”51 
According to the Towns bill, the NCAA was a state actor “when the 
 
47 Id. Interestingly, the major Lee Committee recommendations that the NCAA rejected 
are similar to recommendations this Article will offer, namely that the NCAA “establish a 
group of neutral former judges as hearing offices entrusted with resolving factual disputes 
before the Infractions Committee decides penalties, and . . . open[] up the Infractions 
Committee hearings to the public except when highly confidential matters are being 
presented.” Due Process and the NCAA: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 14 n.27 [hereinafter Due 
Process and the NCAA]. 
48 YASSER ET AL., supra note 29, at 98–99. 
49 PORTO, supra note 2, at 148. 
50 H.R. 2157, 102d Cong. (1st Sess. 1991). 
51 PORTO, supra note 2, at 156. 
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final or decisive act of suspending or reprimanding a coach, player, or 
institution of higher education is carried out as a result of sanctions 
imposed, or the threat of sanctions, by the NCAA upon such coach, 
player, or institution.”52 
Also in 1991, Tom McMillen (D-MD) introduced the Collegiate 
Athletics Reform Act,53 which would have given the NCAA a five-
year exemption from the antitrust laws, enabling it to regain the 
control of televised college football it had lost in 1984 when the 
Supreme Court had invalidated the Association’s longstanding 
Football Television Plan on antitrust grounds.54 In return for 
conferring a temporary antitrust exemption on the NCAA, 
the McMillen bill would have required the Association to honor the 
constitutional guarantee of due process before suspending or 
reprimanding a coach or player from a member institution, 
prohibiting a member institution from participating in an amateur 
athletic event, or suspending a member institution’s right to televise 
athletic events featuring its teams.55 
Thus, both the McMillen bill and the Towns bill sought to 
effectively overturn the Supreme Court’s decision in NCAA v. 
Tarkanian; however, neither bill was enacted.56 
The Tarkanian decision remains the law today, so absent 
congressional legislation imposing more stringent standards of 
fairness in NCAA enforcement proceedings, “only the NCAA’s own 
version of due process will constrain it.”57 Admittedly, the NCAA’s 
version of due process has expanded and improved since the dark 
days of the 1970s, when it set its sights on Jerry Tarkanian.58 As of 
2013, just before the most recent enforcement changes took effect, the 
NCAA’s due process protections included: 
notice of an inquiry and notice of specific allegations; 
a right to be represented by counsel for both individuals and 
institutions; 
 
52 H.R. 2157. 
53 H.R. 3046, 102d Cong. (1st Sess. 1991). 
54 See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 
85 (1984). 
55 PORTO, supra note 2, at 157 (citing David Williams, II, Is the Federal Government 
Suiting Up to Play in the Reform Game?, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 621, 635 (1991)). 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 160–61. 
58 Id. at 161. 
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the tape-recording of witness interviews unless the interviewee 
objects; 
a four-year statute of limitations (subject to exceptions), meaning 
that any alleged violation presented to the COI must have occurred 
within four years before notification that an investigation has 
begun; 
notice of the witnesses and the information on which the NCAA 
staff will rely during the hearing; 
a prohibition on the consideration of information from confidential 
sources; 
recording and transcription of the COI hearing; 
a burden of proof resting with the NCAA; and 
the opportunity for an appeal.59 
These guarantees are a far cry from the meager protections that 
were available to Jerry Tarkanian in the 1970s, when his case began. 
He was entitled to a lawyer and an appeal, but the NCAA nonetheless 
enjoyed a tremendous procedural advantage, because “it controlled 
the flow of information during the enforcement process. Tarkanian 
did not know what evidence the NCAA staff would present against 
him, and much of that evidence was the investigators’ recollections, 
from handwritten notes, of their interviews with witnesses. Tarkanian 
did not have access to those notes.”60 Thus, “[t]he most significant 
improvements since Jerry Tarkanian’s day are the tape-recording of 
witness interviews and the notice to accused individuals and 
institutions of the witnesses and information on which the NCAA 
investigative staff will rely.”61 
Still, as will become clearer in Part IV, in light of the high stakes 
involved for coaches and athletes in today’s high-dollar world of 
commercialized college sports, the protections noted above fall short 
of providing fairness to individuals and institutions in NCAA 
enforcement proceedings. Such sentiments were evident during 
hearings held on the NCAA’s enforcement process by the House 
Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on the Constitution in 
September 2004. The subcommittee’s chair, Representative Steve 
Chabot (R-OH), voiced the concern of some of his colleagues that 
although NCAA enforcement procedures were fairer in 2004 than 
 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 161–62. 
61 Id. at 161. 
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they had been previously, they still fell short of ensuring due 
process.62 Furthermore, “Mr. Chabot noted that in the wake of the 
Lee Committee’s report, the Association had strengthened its 
appellate system for infractions, providing more protections for 
schools, athletes, and coaches.”63 He added, though, that the NCAA 
had not adopted “the 1991 study’s recommendations to hire 
independent judges to hear infractions cases and to open infractions 
hearings to the public.”64 
Witness comments also reflected frustration with the continued 
shortcomings of the NCAA enforcement process. B. David Ridpath, 
then a professor of sports administration at Mississippi State 
University and a former assistant athletic director for compliance at 
Marshall University, recommended “opening up the infractions and 
hearing process to the public,” establishing “an independent 
Committee on Infractions, [excluding] anybody from [NCAA] 
member institutions,” and “due process for all” involved in an NCAA 
investigation, including athletes, coaches, and athletic department 
employees.65 Similarly, Gary Roberts, then a professor at Tulane 
University Law School, testified: 
I believe that both the Committee on Infractions and the Infractions 
Appeals Committee in Division I should be composed of paid 
professional jurists—not necessarily current or former public 
judges, but highly respected individuals with training in law and 
dispute resolution whose motives, knowledge, and skill could not 
reasonably be doubted.66 
The subcommittee did not act on these recommendations, so the 
frustrations expressed by Professors Ridpath and Roberts in 2004 
remain ten years later, having been heightened by the NCAA’s 
overreaching in the Miami investigation, as evidenced by the 
reference quoted earlier about “outsourcing” NCAA investigations to 
third parties.67 Part II will discuss the Miami investigation as 
illustrative of some of the continuing shortcomings of the NCAA 
enforcement process. 
 
62 Id. at 148. 
63 Id. (citation omitted). 
64 Id. (citation omitted). 
65 Due Process and the NCAA, supra note 47, at 111 (testimony of B. David Ridpath, 
Assistant Professor of Sport Administration, Mississippi State University). 
66 Id. at 16 (testimony of Gary R. Roberts, Deputy Dean, Director of Sports Law, 
Tulane Law School). 
67 Mandel, supra note 27. 
PORTO (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2014  1:11 PM 
2014] New Rules for an Old Game: Recent Changes to the  1069 
NCAA Enforcement Process and Some Suggestions for the Future 
II 
THE MIAMI INVESTIGATION: CATALYST FOR CHANGE? 
Recall that when the NCAA discovered its investigator had 
obtained information during the University of Miami investigation to 
which the Association was not entitled, the COI decided that the 
tainted information, which had been obtained from depositions taken 
during bankruptcy proceedings, would be excluded in Miami’s 
enforcement proceedings. Accordingly, the enforcement staff did not 
rely on any of that information before or during the COI hearing.68 
The investigation itself dated back to 2011, when Nevin Shapiro was 
sentenced to a twenty-year prison term for operating a Ponzi scheme 
and told the NCAA he previously gave cash and other impermissible 
gifts to University of Miami athletes.69 
More precisely, Shapiro pleaded guilty to securities fraud and 
money laundering in September 2010 in connection with his Ponzi 
scheme and received the twenty-year prison sentence in June 2011.70 
He had used his company, Capitol Investments USA, Inc., “to raise 
approximately $930 million from individuals who believed they were 
investing in a grocery-distribution business.”71 The Ponzi scheme 
collapsed in 2009, and the investors forced Shapiro and his company 
into an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding.72 
In February 2011, Shapiro contacted the NCAA’s enforcement 
staff to discuss his allegations against Miami and told them that he 
had used proceeds from the Ponzi scheme to benefit Miami athletes 
with the knowledge of certain Miami coaches and staff.73 As if that 
news were not bad enough, the NCAA learned in the late summer and 
early fall of 2012 that its enforcement staff had improperly retained 
Mr. Shapiro’s attorney, Maria Elena Perez, to use the depositions she 
would take in Shapiro’s bankruptcy proceeding to help the 
 
68 University of Miami Lacked Institutional Control Resulting in a Decade of 
Violations, NCAA.ORG (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media          
-center/press-releases/university-miami-lacked-institutional-control-resulting. 
69 David Wharton, Review of NCAA Enforcement Program is Completed, L.A. TIMES 
(Feb. 6, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/print/2013/feb/06/sports/la-sp-0207-ncaa-en 
forcement-20130207. 
70 KENNETH L. WAINSTEIN ET AL., REPORT ON THE NCAA’S ENGAGEMENT OF A 
SOURCE’S COUNSEL AND USE OF THE BANKRUPTCY PROCESS IN ITS UNIVERSITY OF 
MIAMI INVESTIGATION 6 (2013). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 6–7. 
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Association determine what violations Miami had committed and who 
was responsible.74 The NCAA quickly retained Kenneth L. 
Wainstein, a partner with the law firm of Cadwalader, Wickersham & 
Taft LLP, to investigate and announced that the enforcement staff 
would suspend the Miami matter “until all the facts surrounding [the 
alleged improper employment of Ms. Perez] are known.”75 
When their investigation was complete, Mr. Wainstein and his 
colleagues filed a report, which focused on “whether NCAA 
Enforcement Staff took inappropriate steps in their efforts to secure 
testimony and records through the bankruptcy process, and if so, to 
determine how that happened.”76 The NCAA lacked subpoena power; 
hence it could not compel testimony from reluctant witnesses by 
means outside of its enforcement program, which included the 
bankruptcy process.77 Aware that the Association was facing 
uncooperative and unreliable witnesses in the Miami investigation, 
Attorney Perez, who was Mr. Shapiro’s criminal lawyer, told NCAA 
Director of Enforcement Ameen Najjar that she could assist the 
Association’s investigation.78 Her plan was to qualify to represent Mr. 
Shapiro in his bankruptcy case and then “us[e] bankruptcy subpoenas 
to compel deposition[] [testimony] from witnesses who had refused to 
cooperate with the NCAA.”79 
The Association’s legal staff, which is separate from the 
enforcement staff, considered the Perez proposal and advised Mr. 
Najjar that the enforcement staff should not hire Ms. Perez to take 
bankruptcy depositions for the Association.80 Nonetheless, Mr. 
Najjar, acting on his own authority, accepted her proposal and began 
coordinating depositions.81 Indeed, Mr. Najjar lied to his superiors on 
the enforcement staff, assuring them that the legal staff had approved 
the Perez proposal.82 Evidently, he rationalized proceeding with the 
depositions by concluding that under his arrangement with Ms. Perez, 
the NCAA would not be “hiring” or “retaining” her, but rather, would 
 
74 Patterson, supra note 12. 
75 Id. 
76 WAINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 70, at 1. 
77 Patterson, supra note 12. 
78 WAINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 70, at 2. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
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merely be reimbursing her for costs she incurred by taking the 
depositions. 
Unfortunately for the NCAA, Mr. Najjar did not bother to check 
with the legal staff to learn whether his “reimbursement” plan would 
change the lawyers’ minds about obtaining the deposition 
testimony.83 Perhaps he surmised that the new plan would not make 
any difference to the legal staff because the two major barriers to 
hiring Ms. Perez to take depositions would remain: (1) under NCAA 
protocols, only the legal staff could hire outside counsel, and (2) the 
deposition arrangement was an effort to circumvent the NCAA’s lack 
of subpoena power, hence to obtain information to which the 
Association was not entitled.84 As a result, the enforcement staff did 
not learn that the legal staff had nixed Mr. Najjar’s plan until after he 
had left the NCAA’s employ in May 2012.85 
Meanwhile, between December 2011 and June 2012, Ms. Perez 
submitted invoices to the NCAA requesting reimbursement for costs, 
including copying, a court reporter, and the rental of a conference 
room.86 These invoices did not raise any red flags at the NCAA, so 
the enforcement staff paid them.87 But in August 2012, Ms. Perez 
sent the Association an invoice for her billable hours in the amount of 
$57,115 ($350 per hour), which raised a large, bright red flag in the 
mind of Julie Roe Lach, the NCAA’s Vice President for Enforcement, 
who had been Mr. Najjar’s immediate supervisor when he worked at 
the NCAA.88 Ms. Lach “had told Mr. Najjar that his budget for 
working with Ms. Perez was $15,000.”89 
Faced with Ms. Perez’s bill, the enforcement staff consulted with 
the legal staff about some of her charges, whereupon both staffs 
discovered that Mr. Najjar had acted without authority, causing Ms. 
Perez to take two depositions, contrary to the legal staff’s advice.90 
The two staffs agreed to pay Ms. Perez $18,000 for her costs and 
services and to sever the NCAA’s relationship with her.91 The NCAA 
 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 16. 
85 Id. at 2. 
86 Id. at 23. 
87 Id. at 23–24. 
88 Id. at 24. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 25. 
91 Id. 
PORTO (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2014  1:11 PM 
1072 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92, 1057 
informed the University of Miami and the public about the misstep in 
its investigation and, as noted earlier, retained Mr. Wainstein to look 
into the Association’s attempt to acquire bankruptcy deposition 
testimony in the Miami case.92 At that point, Dr. Emmert, the NCAA 
president, suspended the Miami case until after completion of the 
Wainstein investigation.93 
Meanwhile, individuals from the enforcement and legal staffs 
removed from the investigative record in the Miami case any 
information the NCAA had derived, either directly or indirectly, from 
the two depositions Ms. Perez took.94 According to the Wainstein 
Report, this decision, which the legal staff made in consultation with 
Dr. Emmert, was based not on a particular NCAA bylaw, but instead 
on the “fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree” concept in Fourth Amendment 
law, which bars the use of evidence obtained from an illegal search in 
court proceedings.95 The result of these exclusions was that the 
NCAA removed some factual allegations from the record in their 
entirety and removed portions of other allegations.96 
The Wainstein Report concluded that both the Legal Staff and the 
Enforcement Staff behaved appropriately once they realized Mr. 
Najjar had acted contrary to legal advice in going forward with the 
Perez proposal.97 Despite determining that no “NCAA employee 
knowingly violated a specific [NCAA] bylaw or [state or federal] 
law,”98 the Report nevertheless observed that “it was simply not 
reasonable for Mr. Najjar to proceed with Ms. Perez’s proposal in 
light of the clear advice to the contrary from the Legal Staff.”99 And 
despite determining that the arrangement agreed to by Mr. Najjar and 
Ms. Perez did not violate any bankruptcy rule,100 the Report opined 
that both Mr. Najjar and his bosses paid “insufficient attention to the 
concern that the Perez proposal could constitute a manipulation of the 
bankruptcy process.”101 The Report added that Mr. Najjar’s 
immediate supervisor, Ms. Lach, and her supervisor, Tom Hosty 
 
92 Id. at 3. 
93 Id. at 49. 
94 Id. at 25. 
95 Id. at 27. 
96 Id. at 28. 
97 Id. at 4. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 30. 
101 Id. at 4. 
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(Managing Director of Enforcement),102 “exercised insufficient 
oversight of Mr. Najjar’s handling of the Perez proposal and . . . 
failed to detect and rectify the problems with the Perez proposal for 
almost a full year.”103 
The Report also made clear that, “unlike Mr. Najjar, . . . Ms. Lach 
never knowingly took any steps that were inconsistent with legal 
advice. . . . The facts clearly indicate,” the Report continued, “that 
Ms. Lach went along with the Perez proposal only because Mr. Najjar 
assured her that the Legal Staff had approved it.”104 Still, the Report 
found that “[n]either Ms. Lach nor Mr. Hosty examined the Perez 
proposal carefully enough to appreciate the prudential concerns it 
raised,” and that “[n]either Ms. Lach nor Mr. Hosty checked with 
[the] Legal Staff to confirm that [the Legal Staff] had reversed [its] 
original advice and accepted Mr. Najjar’s ‘way around’” the lawyers’ 
objections to the Perez proposal.105 Similarly, among the Report’s 
“General Findings” were that “Mr. Najjar adopted and Ms. Lach and 
Mr. Hosty went along with the Perez proposal without sufficiently 
considering whether it was consistent with the NCAA membership’s 
understanding about the limits of the Enforcement Staff’s 
investigative powers.”106 
Thus, the Wainstein Report answered the question it had set out to 
answer, namely, how the NCAA came to adopt and approve paying 
“a source’s attorney to insert herself into an ongoing bankruptcy 
proceeding and to use its subpoena power to compel depositions from 
uncooperative witnesses.”107 The answer, according to the Wainstein 
Report, lay in a “series of missteps.”108 Noting that “the Perez 
proposal was unquestionably a bad idea for the NCAA,”109 the Report 
concluded that “[t]he decision to forge ahead with [it] in the face of 
 
102 Id. at 2. 
103 Id. at 5. 
104 Id. at 42. 
105 Id. at 49. At about the same time the Wainstein Report was released, NCAA 
President Mark Emmert fired Ms. Lach, who had worked for the NCAA for fifteen years. 
Dana O’Neil, Prez Leaves Accountability to Others, ESPN.COM (Feb. 18, 2013), 
http://espn.go.com/espn/print?id=8960028&type=story. 
106 Id. at 51. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 52. 
109 Id. 
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significant concerns reflected both a lapse of judgment and an 
insufficient regard for the NCAA’s reputation and its credibility.”110 
As noted earlier, the Wainstein investigation temporarily 
suspended the NCAA’s inquiry into alleged infractions by the 
University of Miami.111 Once the Wainstein Report was published, in 
February 2013, the NCAA’s investigation of Miami resumed absent 
evidence derived—either directly or indirectly—from the two 
bankruptcy depositions taken by Ms. Perez.112 The Miami 
investigation concluded in October 2013 when the COI announced its 
findings and its penalties against the Hurricanes.113 Those findings 
addressed eighteen allegations, with seventy-nine subparts, and the 
written record, which included 118 interviews of eighty-one 
individuals, filled fifteen binders, and totaled several thousand 
pages.114 
The investigation ultimately found numerous violations of NCAA 
rules in Miami’s football program between 2002 and 2010 involving 
Nevin Shapiro, who, in the salad days of his Ponzi scheme, had 
provided cash, meals, lodging, transportation, and other benefits to 
approximately thirty current and prospective Hurricane athletes, some 
of which he gave to identify and secure new clients for a sports 
agency business in which he had invested.115 For its part, the 
University, specifically its athletic department, had failed to take “any 
significant steps” to educate Mr. Shapiro about NCAA rules or to 
“monitor his activities” despite his “uncommon access [including 
leading the team out of the locker room onto the field at home games] 
to [athletic department] staff and athletes.”116 
Not surprisingly, under these circumstances the NCAA found 
Miami responsible for a “lack of institutional control” for failing to 
oversee Mr. Shapiro’s athletic boosterism and for maintaining what 
the COI termed “a culture of noncompliance” with NCAA rules in the 
athletic department.117 According to the COI, Miami lacked 
procedures for athletic department staff members to report potential 
 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 49. 
112 Id. at 25. 
113 See NCAA, UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT (2013). 
114 Id. at 3. 
115 Id. at 33, 35–37. 
116 Id. at 33. 
117 Id. at 56. 
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rules violations without fear of retribution.118 Furthermore, the 
policies Miami did have were generally ignored or applied 
unevenly.119 
As a result, the COI imposed numerous penalties on the University 
and several of its current and former coaches, including three years of 
probation ending on October 21, 2016.120 The football program will 
lose three scholarships per year in 2014–15, 2015–16, and 2016–
17.121 One former Miami assistant football coach may not recruit 
players for his current institution until June 10, 2014, may not receive 
performance raises or bonuses until May 21, 2015, and must attend 
NCAA regional rules seminars in 2014 and 2015.122 That coach is 
also subject to a two-year show-cause order ending October 21, 2015, 
meaning that if he leaves his current institution and seeks to work at 
another NCAA-member institution before the above date, the new 
employer would have to show cause why the NCAA should not limit 
his athletically related duties based on his previous rules violations.123 
A second former assistant football coach will also be subject to a 
show-cause order, plus required attendance at NCAA regional rules 
seminars during the show-cause period, if he seeks employment at an 
NCAA-member school in the future.124 
Similarly, the COI reduced Miami’s men’s basketball scholarship 
allotment by one per year in 2014–15, 2015–16, and 2016–17.125 The 
former head coach was suspended for the first five games of his 
current institution’s 2013–14 season.126 The suspension prohibited 
him from participating not only in the games themselves, but also in 
team travel, practice, film study, and team meetings.127 He was also 
required to attend an NCAA rules seminar in 2013–14.128 
Additionally, one former assistant basketball coach faces a two-year 
show-cause penalty ending October 21, 2015, which could limit his 
duties for a designated period if he obtains employment at another 
 
118 Id. at 57. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 63. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 65. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 66. 
125 Id. at 67. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 68. 
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NCAA-member institution.129 And if he obtains such employment, he 
must attend an NCAA regional rules seminar annually during the 
show-cause period.130 
The COI also imposed several administrative requirements on the 
Miami Athletic Department. For example, during the probationary 
period, the department must hire an outside group experienced in 
NCAA rules compliance to conduct a comprehensive compliance 
review and must develop and implement educational programs about 
the NCAA bylaws for coaches, the University’s Faculty Athletics 
Representative (FAR), and department staff.131 The department was 
required to submit to the COI by December 15, 2013, a report 
identifying a schedule for accomplishing the educational program.132 
Finally, during the probationary period, the athletic department must 
(1) file an annual compliance report with the COI; (2) inform 
prospective athletes in the penalized sports about the probation and 
about the specific violations that precipitated it;133 and (3) publicize 
the nature of the violations and put a “direct, conspicuous link to the 
public infractions report” on the department’s main web page.134 
Thus, after publicly acknowledging its own errors in the Miami 
investigation and expunging tainted material from the investigative 
record, the NCAA still found “a failure to monitor” in the Hurricanes’ 
athletic department sufficient to impose major penalties on the 
institution and current and former employees.135 Ironically, at the 
same time that Mr. Najjar was conducting the NCAA’s Miami 
investigation by his own rules, the Association, led by Ms. Lach, was 
designing a new enforcement structure that went into effect on August 
1, 2013.136 In light of the mistakes made in the Miami case and recent 
 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 71. 
132 Id. at 72. 
133 Football and men’s basketball were not the only sports at Miami that the NCAA 
penalized. Indeed, the Association’s investigation discovered that Miami coaches in ten 
sports other than football had sent thirty-one impermissible text messages to thirteen 
prospective athletes between 2007 and 2010. Id. at 31. The NCAA accepted Miami’s 
institutionally imposed penalty for those coaches, namely, salary freezes and restrictions 
on recruiting during the probationary period. Id. at 69. 
134 Id. at 72. 
135 Id. at 3. 
136 Indeed, Ms. Lach attributed her failure to keep a closer watch on Mr. Najjar and to 
question him carefully about whether the NCAA legal staff had approved his arrangement 
with Ms. Perez to being “overwhelmed” in the fall of 2011, “as she focused on leading the 
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speculation about “outsourcing” NCAA enforcement, this “new” 
structure may well be the subject of reform itself in the near future. 
Part III will outline the main features of the recently revised NCAA 
enforcement process. 
III 
THE NCAA ENFORCEMENT PROCESS POST-AUGUST 1, 2013 
When the NCAA’s enforcement staff learns, from an athlete, a 
high school or college coach, a journalist, or another source, of 
possible violations of Association rules at a member institution, it 
must determine whether an investigation is warranted or the matter 
can be resolved without an investigation.137 If an investigation is 
warranted, the enforcement staff will provide a Notice of Inquiry 
(NOI) to the institution’s president or chancellor, either orally or in 
writing.138 Under the new structure, the enforcement staff must issue 
the NOI to the institution before the staff can conduct on-campus 
interviews.139 The enforcement staff then begins an investigation, 
with which the institution is obligated to cooperate.140 If investigators 
discover evidence that warrants a COI hearing, a Notice of 
Allegations (NOA) will be published.141 
The NOA, which the enforcement staff issues to institutions and 
individuals involved in the investigation, will identify the nature and 
the “possible level” of each alleged violation.142 That enforcement 
structure provides for four levels of violation, ranging from “severe” 
to “incidental,” which have replaced the previous two-layer approach, 
consisting of “major” and “secondary” violations.143 The NCAA 
advertises the new enforcement structure as better reflecting the 
 
Enforcement Working Group, which was charged with reforming Enforcement’s policies 
and procedures.” WAINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 70, at 42 n.53. 
137 NCAA, 2013–14 NCAA DIVISION 1 MANUAL § 19.5.1 (2013) [hereinafter NCAA 
MANUAL], available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D114.pdf. 
138 Id. § 19.5.3. 
139 Casey C. Kannenberg, The New NCAA Enforcement Model, A.B.A., http://www 
.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_series/the 
_new_ncaa_enforcement_model.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
140 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 137, § 19.2.3; Stuart L. Brown, Mark Jones & Carrie 
R. McCaw, The NCAA Infractions Enforcement Process—Role of Counsel, ICEMILLER 
LEGAL COUNS. (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.icemiller.com/ice-on-fire-insights/publications 
/the-ncaa-infractions-enforcement-process-role-of-c/. 
141 Brown et al., supra note 140. 
142 Kannenberg, supra note 139. 
143 New Violation Structure, supra note 21. 
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varying degrees of severity that its cases represent and “align[ing] 
more predictably with the significance of the wrongdoing, while also 
addressing any advantage gained from that wrongdoing.”144 
According to Oregon State University President Ed Ray, having four 
levels of violation is a major improvement.145 “In reviewing past 
cases,” he observed, “we found that people who committed pretty 
serious violations sometimes ended up characterized as guilty of a 
secondary violation, which they tried to minimize to others as not 
important.”146 
Level I violations are “severe breach[es] of conduct . . . that 
seriously undermine or threaten the integrity of the NCAA . . . 
including any violation that provides or is intended to provide a 
substantial or extensive recruiting, competitive or other advantage, or 
a substantial or extensive impermissible benefit.”147 Level I violations 
include: 
“(a) Lack of institutional control; 
(b) Academic fraud; 
(c) Failure to cooperate in an NCAA enforcement investigation; 
(d) Individual unethical or dishonest conduct . . . ; 
(e) A [head-coach-responsibility] violation by a head coach 
resulting from an underlying Level I violation by an individual within 
the sport program . . . .”148 
Level II violations, which the NCAA designates as “significant 
breach[es] of conduct,” confer, or are intended to confer, “more than a 
minimal but less than a substantial or extensive recruiting, 
competitive or other advantage” or “more than a minimal but less 
than a substantial or extensive impermissible benefit.”149 
Alternatively, such a breach “may compromise the integrity of the 
NCAA Collegiate Model as set forth in the [NCAA’s] constitution 
and bylaws.”150 Level II violations include: 
(a) Violations that do not rise to the level of Level I violations and 
are more serious than Level III violations; 
 
144 New Reform Efforts Take Hold August 1, NCAA.ORG (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www 
.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/new-reform-efforts-take-hold-august-1. 
145 Q&A with Oregon State President Ed Ray, NCAA.ORG (Oct. 30, 2012), 
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/qa-oregon-state-president-ed-ray. 
146 Id. 
147 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 137, § 19.1.1. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. § 19.1.2. 
150 Id. 
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. . . . 
(c) Systemic violations that do not amount to a lack of institutional 
control; 
(d) Multiple recruiting, financial aid, or eligibility violations that 
do not amount to a lack of institutional control; 
. . . .  
(f) Collective Level III violations.151 
Level III violations, designated as “breaches of conduct,” are 
“isolated or limited in nature; provide no more than a minimal 
recruiting, competitive, or other advantage; and provide no more than 
a minimal impermissible benefit.”152 Multiple Level IV violations, 
taken together, may also constitute a Level III violation.153 Finally, 
Level IV violations, designated as “incidental infraction[s],” are 
inadvertent and isolated, technical in nature and result in a negligible, 
if any, competitive advantage; generally, they do not render an athlete 
ineligible to compete.154 
Once an institution receives an NOA from the enforcement staff, 
the institution and any other accused party named in the document 
have ninety days in which to respond in writing.155 After receiving 
the accused parties’ responses to the NOA, 
the enforcement staff will prepare two documents . . . : (i) a written 
reply, due within 60 days of receipt of the [accused] parties’ 
responses, and (ii) a ‘statement of the case,’ submitted after the 
conclusion of any pre-hearing conferences. The ‘statement of the 
case’ will summarize the history of the case and identify remaining 
area[s] of disagreement between the parties and the enforcement 
staff, much like the ‘case summary’ in the prior process.156 
But the new document will deviate from its predecessor by being 
“more of an enforcement staff advocacy document,” designed to 
better enable both sides to focus their hearing preparation on matters 
actually in dispute.157 
The COI holds hearings in both Level I and Level II cases; the 
former are usually held in person, whereas the latter will typically be 
 
151 Id. 
152 Id. § 19.1.3. 
153 Id. § 19.1.4. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. § 19.7.2. 
156 Brown et al., supra note 25; see also NCAA MANUAL, supra note 137, § 19.7.3. 
157 Brown et al., supra note 25. 
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conducted by phone or videoconference unless the COI hearing panel 
requests an in-person hearing or the parties agree to submit the case 
on the pleadings (i.e., without oral presentations).158 This 
arrangement replaces a previous rule under which all COI hearings 
were held in person.159 Also new is that in Level I cases with few or 
uncomplicated issues, “the institution and/or the involved individual 
may make a written request to appear before the [COI] panel by 
videoconference or other mode of distance communication,” and the 
panel may grant or deny the request.160 Under the new structure, the 
COI “will expand [from 10] to as many as 24 members and include 
the additional perspectives of university presidents, coaches and 
others.”161 The larger size will enable the committee to hear cases in 
panels, presumably facilitating faster resolution of pending matters.162 
President Ray notes: “By expanding the Committee on Infractions to 
as many as 24 members and creating multiple panels of 5-7 members 
from that ‘pool’ that can adjudicate cases more frequently, we expect 
to be able to cut the ‘time to closure’ in half, at least for the less-
complicated cases.”163 The new structure also requires the entire COI 
to meet at least twice a year to compare the panels’ decisions in 
similar cases for consistency.164 
COI hearings are confidential, hence closed to the public. Indeed, 
attendance is limited to: (1) the hearing panel, (2) the parties and their 
representatives, (3) applicable conference representatives, (4) the 
subsequent employing institution of an accused individual (e.g., a 
coach), (5) a court reporter or recorder, (6) audio-visual support staff, 
and (7) anyone else approved by the chief hearing officer as 
 
158 Kannenberg, supra note 139. In Level III cases, the enforcement staff determines 
whether one or more violations occurred and, if so, the Vice President for Enforcement or 
a designee decides whether a penalty is appropriate and, if it is, what that penalty will be. 
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 137, §§ 19.11.2, 19.11.3. The Vice President’s decision is 
appealable to the COI. Id. § 19.11.4. In Level IV cases, if the enforcement staff concludes 
that a case should be processed, it will refer the matter to the accused institution’s 
conference for resolution. Id. § 19.12.2. 
159 Brown et al., supra note 25. 
160 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 137, § 19.7.7; see also Brown et al., supra note 25. 
161 New Reform Efforts Take Hold August 1, supra note 144. 
162 Id. A computer program will generate panels of five or seven available committee 
members, with alternates, to hear cases. NCAA, DIVISION I COMMITTEE ON INFRACTIONS: 
INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES § 3-1-2 (2013) [hereinafter INTERNAL OPERATING 
PROCEDURES], available at http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/divisioni 
/enforcement/committee+on+infractions. 
163 Q&A with Oregon State President Ed Ray, supra note 145. 
164 Id. 
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necessary.165 The chief hearing officer, who is the chair of the COI 
hearing panel, is authorized to establish the order in which the panel 
will hear the allegations.166 The chief hearing officer also presides 
during the hearing, at which only members of the panel may ask 
questions, unless a party requests to do so, whereupon the chief 
hearing officer will rule on the request.167 
Following the hearing, the panel deliberates and reaches a decision; 
that decision is the consensus of the panel and the final decision of the 
COI, as the rules do not provide for dissents.168 Once the panel 
reaches its decision, the chief hearing officer appoints a panel 
member to conduct a “media call” in conjunction with the release of 
the decision.169 
Besides determining the level of violation that was committed, the 
COI hearing panel will decide whether “aggravating” or “mitigating” 
circumstances exist that may affect the ultimate penalty by justifying 
a higher or lower range of sanctions in a particular case.170 Bylaw 
19.9.3 identifies fourteen aggravating factors, among which are 
“[m]ultiple Level I violations . . . ; [a] history of . . . violations . . . [;] 
[l]ack of institutional control; . . . [and] [o]bstructing an investigation 
or attempting to conceal the violation.”171 Bylaw 19.9.4 sets out eight 
mitigating factors, supporting a lower range of sanctions in a 
particular case.172 Among these are “prompt self-detection and self-
disclosure of the violation(s); prompt acknowledgement of the 
violation, acceptance of responsibility, and . . . imposition of 
meaningful corrective measures and/or penalties; [and] affirmative 
 
165 INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES, supra note 162, § 4-1-2. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. § 4-7. 
168 Id. § 4-15-4. 
169 Id. § 4-17. 
170 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 137, § 19.9.2. 
171 Id. § 19.9.3. The remaining aggravating factors include (1) “[u]nethical conduct, 
compromising the integrity of an investigation, [or] failing to cooperate . . . ;” (2) 
“[v]iolations [that] were premeditated, deliberate or committed after substantial planning;” 
(3) “[m]ultiple Level II violations . . . ;” (4) participation in, condoning of, or negligent 
disregard of the violation by persons in authority; (5) “significant ineligibility or other 
substantial harm to a current student-athlete or prospective student-athlete” resulted from 
the violation(s); (6) “[c]onduct or circumstances demonstrating an abuse of a position of 
trust;” (7) “[a] pattern of noncompliance within the sport program(s) involved;” (8) 
“[c]onduct intended to generate pecuniary gain for the institution or involved individual;” 
(9) “[i]ntentional, willful or blatant disregard for the NCAA constitution and bylaws;” and 
(10) “[o]ther facts warranting a higher penalty range.” Id. 
172 Id. § 19.9.4. 
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steps to expedite resolution of the matter.”173 Instead of merely 
comparing the number of aggravating factors to the number of 
mitigating factors in a particular case, the hearing panel is expected to 
balance the competing factors when deciding to add to or subtract 
from the “standard” penalty (which would apply absent aggravating 
and mitigating factors or when they are in equilibrium) in that case.174 
Whether or not aggravating or mitigating factors are present, as of 
August 1, 2013, NCAA rules provide for seven categories of “core 
penalties” for Level I and II violations. These violations include: (1) 
competition penalties (limiting eligibility for post-season play); (2) 
financial penalties (fines and relinquishment of post-season revenue); 
(3) scholarship reductions; (4) show-cause orders (restrictions on 
some or all athletics-related duties of institutional personnel); (5) head 
coach restrictions (suspensions); (6) recruiting restrictions (limits on 
official and unofficial visits, off-campus activities, and recruiting 
communication); and (7) probation (submission of periodic 
compliance reports, acknowledgement in alumni publications of 
violations committed and penalties imposed, implementation of 
educational or deterrent programs, and audits of specific programs or 
teams).175 Moreover, the penalty ranges within each category under 
the new enforcement structure permit far more stringent penalties 
than were imposed for major infractions cases under the previous 
structure.176 For example, a competition penalty with aggravating 
circumstances could result in a two to four year ban on post-season 
competition, and a recruiting penalty with aggravating circumstances 
could impose a twenty-five to fifty percent reduction in visits to 
prospective athletes, off-campus recruiting, and communication with 
recruits.177 
 
173 Id. The remaining mitigating factors include: (1) “An established history of self-
reporting Level III or secondary violations;” (2) “Implementation of a system of 
compliance methods designed to ensure rules compliance and satisfaction of 
institutional/coaches’ control standards;” (3) “Exemplary cooperation, such as . . . 
[i]dentifying individuals (to be interviewed . . . )” or documents to be reviewed of which 
the NCAA staff was unaware; (4) unintentional violations of limited scope representing “a 
deviation from otherwise compliant practices:” and (5) “Other facts warranting a lower 
penalty range.” Id. 
174 Brown et al., supra note 25. 
175 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 137, § 19.9.5; Brown et al., supra note 25. 
176 Kannenberg, supra note 139. For the full range of possible penalties within the 
seven categories listed above, see NCAA MANUAL, supra note 137, fig. 19.1. 
177 Kannenberg, supra note 139; see also NCAA MANUAL, supra note 137, fig. 19.1. 
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The prospect of increased accountability for head coaches under 
the new enforcement structure is noteworthy. In this regard, President 
Ray has stated: 
We expect head coaches to demonstrate that they’ve put practices 
and training and written materials in place that instruct their 
assistant coaches how to act. If they’ve done that it can become 
mitigating evidence that they shouldn’t be held accountable for 
what an assistant coach did. . . . If there is no guidance and an 
assistant goes rogue, then it’s partly the head coach’s fault and 
he/she should be held accountable.178 
Previously, penalties were based on whether the head coach knew of 
the violations or could be presumed to have known of them.179 Under 
the new enforcement structure, however, if a violation occurs within a 
coach’s program, the head coach is presumed responsible; if the 
coach cannot rebut that presumption, he or she will face charges.180 
“A head coach who is personally involved in a Level 1 violation faces 
up to a 10-year period of restrictions on recruiting and coaching 
activities, including game coaching. A head coach who is personally 
involved in a Level 2 violation faces up to a five-year period of 
restrictions.”181 
In any event, if the COI finds one or more violations and imposes 
penalties, the affected institution or individual has fifteen days in 
which to file notice of intent to appeal any part of the COI’s 
decision.182 Appeals are made to the Infractions Appeals Committee 
(IAC).183 The NCAA’s recent restructuring of its enforcement 
process did not alter the composition, duties, or operations of the IAC, 
which remains comprised of five members, including one member 
from the “general public,” who serve three-year terms and may serve 
up to nine years on the committee.184 
 
178 Q&A with Oregon State President Ed Ray, supra note 145. 
179 Accountability and Penalties, NCAA.ORG (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.ncaa.org 
/about/resources/media-center/news/accountability-and-penalties. 
180 Id. 
181 Brown et al., supra note 25; see also NCAA MANUAL, supra note 137, fig. 19.1. 
182 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 137, § 19.10.2; Brown et al., supra note 140. 
183 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 137, § 19.4; Infractions Appeals Committee, 
NCAA.ORG (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news 
/infractions-appeals-committee. 
184 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 137, §§ 19.4.1, 19.4.4; Infractions Appeals Committee, 
supra note 183. 
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“The appealing party can agree to an appeal based upon written 
submissions only or can request an appeal hearing” before the IAC.185 
Either way, when the IAC acknowledges having received the notice 
of intent to appeal, the appealing party has one month in which to 
submit its appeal.186 The COI then has a month in which to submit a 
document supporting its finding, after which the appealing party has a 
short final opportunity to submit additional information before the 
IAC hearing.187 After considering a case, either via a hearing or 
written submissions, the IAC can uphold, vacate or remand, or 
reverse the COI’s decision.188 It will not reverse unless the appealing 
party can show that (1) the COI’s decision was clearly contrary to the 
evidence; (2) the accused institution or individual did not actually 
violate NCAA rules; (3) a procedural error occurred that caused the 
COI to find a rule violation; or (4) the penalty imposed was 
excessive.189 
If an institution opts not to appeal a COI finding, or if it appeals, 
but the IAC upholds the sanctions imposed by the COI, NCAA 
bylaws require the institution to “comply with the Committee’s 
sanctions and to periodically report [its] compliance to the [COI].”190 
When the IAC hears an appeal, its decision is final.191 
Taken together, the changes the NCAA has made to its 
enforcement process, effective August 1, 2013, are likely to make the 
process faster and enable the NCAA to hold institutions and 
individuals more accountable for their transgressions than it could 
under the previous system. Still, these changes fail to address the 
most persistent critique of NCAA enforcement since the 1970s: that it 
does not treat accused institutions and individuals as fairly as it 
should. That critique prompted the previously mentioned 
Congressional subcommittee hearings in 1978 and 2004 and, fueled 
by the Miami investigation, has also spurred recent calls for 
reorganizing and perhaps outsourcing the NCAA enforcement 
process.192 Part IV will review recent proposals and will present a 
 
185 Brown et al., supra note 140; see also NCAA MANUAL, supra note 137, § 19.10.2. 
186 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 137, § 19.10.3.1; see also Brown et al., supra note 140. 
187 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 137, § 19.10.3.2; see also Brown et al., supra note 140. 
188 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 137, § 19.4.5. 
189 Id. §§ 19.10.1.1, 19.10.1.2. 
190 Brown et al., supra note 140. 
191 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 137, § 19.10.7. 
192 See Mandel, supra note 27; Thamel, supra note 4. 
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new proposal designed to enhance the fairness of the enforcement 
process for accused institutions and individuals. 
IV 
NO MORE HOME-COURT ADVANTAGE: A PLAN TO ENHANCE 
FAIRNESS IN NCAA ENFORCEMENT 
Even a commentary highly supportive of the NCAA enforcement 
process pre-August 1, 2013, has acknowledged that, although 
institutions are formally accountable for alleged violations of NCAA 
rules, individuals are the ones who commit those violations.193 
Hence, the consequences of NCAA-imposed sanctions “fall on 
individuals through an institution’s compliance with NCAA 
directives.”194 Recognizing that impact on individuals, several 
members of Congress have recently introduced legislation seeking to 
ensure that the Association’s enforcement process is fair to college 
athletes.195 The various bills aim to address medical and financial 
issues in college sports too, but at the same time, try to guarantee due 
process for athletes subject to disciplinary procedures.196 
Each bill would amend Section 487(a) of the Higher Education Act 
of 1965.197 One bill, which Representative Charlie Dent (R-PA) 
introduced on August 1, 2013, (the same date the NCAA’s new 
enforcement structure took effect), is known as the “National 
Collegiate Athletics Accountability Act,” or “NCAA Act,” which 
leaves little doubt as to the object of its concern.198 Section 2 of the 
Dent bill would amend Section 487(a) of the Higher Education Act by 
prohibiting institutions that sponsor intercollegiate athletics programs 
(under penalty of losing their federal financial assistance) from 
belonging to “a nonprofit athletic association” unless that association 
meets several requirements the Act imposes.199 Among those 
requirements is that “prior to enforcing any remedy for an alleged 
infraction or violation of the policies of such association,” the 
association must: 
 
193 Josephine R. Potuto, NCAA as State Actor Controversy: Much Ado About Nothing, 
23 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 1, 10 (2012). 
194 Id. 
195 See H.R. 3545, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 2903, 102d Cong. (2013). 
196 See H.R. 3545; H.R. 2903. 
197 20 U.S.C. § 1094 (2012). 
198 H.R. 2903 § 1(a). 
199 Id. § 2(30). 
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(i) provide[] institutions and student athletes with the opportunity 
for a formal administrative hearing, not less than one appeal, 
and 
(ii) any other due process procedure the Secretary [of Education] 
determines by regulation to be necessary; and hold in abeyance 
any such remedy until all appeals have been exhausted or until 
the deadline to appeal has passed, whichever is sooner.200 
Even if the Dent bill is enacted, it is unlikely to increase the 
fairness of NCAA enforcement proceedings for athletes because the 
protections it provides are most necessary in Level I and Level II 
cases, but protections already exist in those cases, as described in 
Section III.201 Therefore, the due process requirements of the Dent 
bill appear most likely to affect Level III and Level IV cases, in which 
procedures are relatively informal, calling into question the need for 
“a formal administrative hearing.”202 The Dent bill could prove 
highly influential, however, if the Secretary of Education were to 
accept its invitation to use regulatory authority to mandate that the 
NCAA put additional protections in place for athletes subject to its 
enforcement process.203 Absent action by the Secretary, though, the 
Dent bill will not make that process any fairer to accused parties than 
it is today unless the NCAA were to again abandon its customary 
enforcement process, as it did in the Penn State case, in favor of an ad 
hoc alternative designed to respond to unusual circumstances. That 
scenario is unlikely, but considering the language of the Dent bill and 
its introduction by a Pennsylvania congressman, its insistence on a 
formal administrative hearing apparently aims to prevent the NCAA 
from repeating the ad hoc enforcement process used in the Penn State 
case.204 
Another bill, which Representative Tony Cardenas (D-CA) 
introduced on November 20, 2013, is known as the “Collegiate 
 
200 Id. § 2(30)(B). The other requirements are that a nonprofit athletic association (1) 
mandate “annual baseline concussion testing” for athletes playing sports designated as 
“contact/collision” or “limited-contact/impact” sports; (2) guarantee for up to four years 
the athletic scholarships of athletes who play contact/collision sports (boxing, field 
hockey, football, ice hockey, lacrosse, martial arts, rodeo, soccer, and wrestling), whether 
or not the athlete is injured or demonstrates satisfactory athletic skill; and (3) not prohibit 
institutions from paying “stipends” (presumably equal to the difference between the full 
cost of attendance and the amount of an athletic scholarship) to their athletes. Id. §§ 
2(30)(A), (C). 
201 See supra Part III. 
202 H.R. 2903 § 2(30)(B)(i). 
203 See id. 
204 I am indebted to Donna Lopiano, one of the authors of the CAP Act, for this insight. 
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Student Athlete Protection Act.”205 Like the Dent bill, the Cardenas 
bill seeks to amend Section 487(a) of the Higher Education Act of 
1965 to facilitate several changes in the operation of college sports 
designed to benefit athletes.206 Unlike the Dent bill, though, the 
Cardenas bill would apply only to an institution having an athletic 
program that earns $10 million or more annually from media rights 
associated with television appearances by its teams or by teams 
belonging to the conference of which the institution is a member.207 
The Cardenas bill would amend section 487(a) by adding to it a 
series of “Athletic Program Requirements”208 to be met by “an 
intercollegiate athletic program of an institution of higher education” 
meeting the $10 million threshold, under penalty of losing its federal 
financial assistance for failing to comply.209 Therefore, the Cardenas 
bill also differs from the Dent bill by focusing its attention on colleges 
and universities rather than the NCAA. Among the program 
requirements that the Cardenas bill would apply to institutions 
meeting the $10 million threshold is the provision of “a formal 
administrative hearing, not less than 1 appeal, and [adoption of] any 
other due process procedure the Secretary [of Education] determines 
by regulation to be necessary” for any athlete facing a “loss or 
reduction of athletically related student aid for a violation of a 
disciplinary standard of the institution.”210 
The Cardenas bill misses its target by mandating due process by 
institutions even though the key regulatory authority in college sports 
is the NCAA, not individual institutions.211 Therefore, the NCAA, not 
institutions, should be the primary focus of legislation seeking to 
ensure fairness for college athletes in disciplinary proceedings. 
A better alternative to the Dent and Cardenas bills is the “College 
Athlete Protection Act” (CAP Act),212 which was drafted by the 
 
205 H.R. 3545, 113th Cong. § 1(a) (2013). 
206 Id. § 1(b)–(c). 
207 Id. § 2(a). 
208 Id. § 2(b). 
209 Id. § 2(b)(k)(2). 
210 Id. § 2(b)(k)(2)(C). 
211 Besides due process, the Cardenas bill also addresses the continuation of athletic 
scholarships for injured athletes, the length of athletic scholarships, insurance coverage for 
college athletes, and other matters related to the wellbeing of athletes during their college 
years. See id. §§ 2(b)(k)(2)(A), (E). 
212 The Drake Group, College Athlete Protection Act Draft (Feb. 25, 2014) [hereinafter 
CAP Act] (on file with author). 
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Drake Group,213 a college-sports watchdog organization. The CAP 
Act focuses its attention squarely on the NCAA.214 Like the Dent and 
Cardenas bills, the CAP Act addresses more than just the fairness of 
NCAA enforcement proceedings; indeed, it reaches academic, 
financial, medical, and insurance issues in college sports, too, along 
with legal issues other than due process.215 
Like the Dent and Cardenas bills, the CAP Act would amend 
Section 487(a) of the Higher Education Act to impose certain 
conditions on the operation of college sports. Specifically, the CAP 
Act would require institutions having athletic programs that earn 
more than $1 million annually to belong only to an athletic 
association that meets certain minimum standards specified in the 
Higher Education Act or risk sacrificing their federal financial 
assistance.216 Due process protections are among some of the 
minimum standards required by the CAP Act. Thus, an athletic 
association (i.e., the NCAA) would have to establish and enforce due 
process protections before issuing a show-cause order or suspend a 
coach, athlete, or other athletics personnel from representing a 
member institution in athletics events; barring a member institution’s 
teams from appearing on television; barring such teams from 
competing; or reducing an athlete’s financial aid amount or award 
period.217 
 
213 The Drake Group, founded in 1999, is a nonprofit organization comprised mainly of 
college faculty members, whose principal aim is “academic integrity in collegiate sport.” 
Our Mission and Goals, THE DRAKE GROUP, http://thedrakegroup.org/2012/12/04 
/hutchins-award-2/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2014). According to its website, the group’s vision 
is “to create an atmosphere on college campuses that encourages personal and intellectual 
growth for all students, and demands excellence and professional integrity from faculty 
charged with teaching.” Our Vision, THE DRAKE GROUP, http://thedrakegroup.org/2012 
/12/04/our-vision/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2014). I am a member of the group and of its 
executive board, and as such I helped draft the CAP Act. 
214 At this writing, early in 2014, the authors of the CAP Act, of whom I am one, are 
seeking a Congressional sponsor. The other authors are Gerald Gurney, Professor of Adult 
and Higher Education at the University of Oklahoma; Donna Lopiano, President of Sports 
Management Resources and former CEO of the Women’s Sports Foundation; Allen Sack, 
President of the Drake Group and Professor of Sociology at the University of New Haven; 
and Andrew Zimbalist, Professor of Economics at Smith College. 
215 CAP Act, supra note 212; see also Brad Wolverton, Watchdog Group’s Proposal 
Calls for Antitrust Exemption for NCAA, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Oct. 11, 2013), 
http://chronicle.com/blogs/players/watchdog-groups-proposal-calls-for-antitrust-exemp 
tion-for-ncaa/33711. 
216 CAP Act, supra note 212, § 4(30). 
217 Id. § 4(30)(C). 
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The due process provisions of the CAP Act mirror those presented 
in my 2012 book, The Supreme Court and the NCAA.218 Not later 
than one year after enactment of the CAP Act, the athletic association 
would be required to: 
(I) Hire, as independent contractors, former or retired trial, 
appellate, or administrative law judges, to hear and decide 
Level I and II cases, and experienced investigators to 
investigate allegations of rules violations. The judges “would 
preside at hearings and appeals, issue subpoenas when 
necessary, and possess exclusive authority to resolve cases, 
including determining penalties. 
(II) In Level I and II cases, establish a pre-hearing “discovery” 
process, including depositions and document production, that 
would enable Association staff and counsel for accused 
parties to exchange pertinent information; 
(III) Also in Level I and II cases, permit accused parties, both 
institutions and individuals, to confront and cross-examine 
opposing witnesses at hearings; 
(IV) At the discretion of the hearing judge, permit a nonparty 
whom one of the parties has identified as having engaged in 
wrongdoing, or having enabled it to occur, to present an oral 
or written statement at the hearing, subject to rebuttal by the 
institution; 
(V) Prohibit member institutions from firing or permanently 
reassigning employees or disassociating themselves from 
boosters whom one of the parties has identified as having 
engaged in or enabled wrongdoing until after the case has 
been resolved and the nonparty’s role in it has been 
determined; and 
(VI) Open all hearings and appellate proceedings to the public 
unless an accused party objects, except in the case of post-
hearing deliberations of appellate panels.219 
Despite these provisions, the CAP Act does not view the NCAA as 
a “state actor” within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, nor 
would it seek to designate the Association as such. Only a court can 
do that and, a recent commentary has noted, even if the NCAA were a 
 
218 See PORTO, supra note 2. 
219 CAP Act, supra note 212, § 4(C). A discussion of the due process provisions of the 
CAP Act is also available in PORTO, supra note 2, at 172–73. 
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state actor, it would not be required to provide due process to athletes 
challenging “denials of, or limits on, their eligibility to compete.”220 
That is because, in the words of the commentary’s author, Professor 
Josephine Potuto, “courts consistently have held that student-athletes 
have no constitutional right to compete and, thus, no cognizable 
reliance interest to which procedural due process protections may 
attach.”221 Coaches, Professor Potuto concedes, “have a 
[constitutionally based] reliance property interest only to the extent 
their contracts of employment provide it; in that case, they also have a 
contract claim that likely affords protection at least equivalent to that 
provided by procedural due process.”222 Finally, she notes, a coach’s 
liberty interest in his or her reputation would be addressed in a tort 
action, so there would be no need to depend on NCAA status as a 
state actor or a claimed failure of procedural due process to reach the 
claimed injury.223 
Even assuming that Professor Potuto’s constitutional analysis is 
correct, it ignores the forest for the trees by stressing the amount of 
process the NCAA is legally obligated to provide instead of the 
amount it should provide. As a nonprofit organization supposedly 
dedicated to maintaining athletics as “an integral part of the 
educational program” and athletes as “an integral part of the student 
body” at its member institutions, the NCAA should provide young, 
often unsophisticated college athletes with every reasonable 
protection when they are subject to its disciplinary procedures.224 
Surely, an organization promoting athletics as a healthy adjunct to a 
college education should set an example of scrupulous fairness when 
deciding the athletic futures of young, impressionable college 
students. Thus, even though the NCAA is not a state actor under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, its enforcement process should strive to be as 
fair as it is efficient and effective. 
According to Professor Potuto, the NCAA’s process is fair because 
it features, among other things, “a neutral and independent COI” and 
“the right to appeal adverse findings to a neutral and independent 
infractions appeals committee.”225 But both the COI and the IAC are 
comprised mostly of employees of NCAA-member institutions with a 
 
220 Potuto, supra note 193, at 11. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. at 11–12. 
224 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 137, § 12.01.2. 
225 Potuto, supra note 193, at 14–16. 
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history of professional involvement in NCAA matters, usually either 
as a college president or an athletic director.226 Under these 
circumstances, it is fair to ask whether such individuals are the most 
neutral and independent persons available to resolve NCAA 
enforcement matters or whether former and retired judges, working as 
independent contractors, would be more neutral, independent, and 
capable of managing the process effectively. 
Professor Potuto states further that at COI hearings, accused parties 
enjoy “a full opportunity to present their case.”227 That claim is open 
to debate, though, because accused parties at NCAA hearings may not 
confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses, but must instead rely 
on members of the COI to ask questions.228 The CAP Act would 
enable accused parties to confront and cross-examine opposing 
witnesses, subject, of course, to limitations imposed by the hearing 
judge.229 
Finally, Professor Potuto underestimates the sting of NCAA 
sanctions for college athletes, writing that “[t]he only action the 
NCAA takes against student-athletes who violate its bylaws and 
policies is to prevent them from competing in NCAA championships 
or on university teams.”230 To be sure, an NCAA sanction does not 
implicate an athlete’s life, liberty, or property, but that is not to say 
that the stakes for a college athlete faced with suspension or expulsion 
from competition are negligible. On the contrary, an athlete who is 
declared permanently ineligible may lose an athletic scholarship and 
with it the opportunity to realize a lifelong dream of playing a college 
sport, pursue a college education at low cost, and possibly prepare for 
a career in professional sports. Even an athlete who is declared 
temporarily ineligible may, as a result of prolonged inactivity, lose the 
chance for a successful collegiate sports career and a professional 
sports career. Recognizing the high stakes for athletes (and coaches, 
whose livelihoods can be at issue) in today’s NCAA enforcement 
process, the CAP Act would mandate legal protections for accused 
 
226 For lists of the current members of these two committees and their professional 
affiliations, see Committee on Infractions, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/governance 
/committees/division-i-committee-infractions (last visited Mar. 2, 2014) and Infractions 
Appeals Committee, supra note 183. 
227 Potuto, supra note 193, at 15–16. 
228 PORTO, supra note 2, at 166. 
229 CAP Act, supra note 212, § 4(C)(ii)(III). 
230 Potuto, supra note 193, at 30. 
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parties commensurate with the potential consequences they face from 
NCAA sanctions.231 
Happily, as Professor Potuto points out, the NCAA need not be a 
state actor under the Fourteenth Amendment to be subject to 
congressional regulation of its enforcement process.232 Indeed, 
Congress may regulate the NCAA and college athletic departments by 
means of its interstate commerce power, its authority under the 
spending power to condition funds provided to institutions of higher 
education, and its power to remove or condition tax exemptions those 
institutions currently enjoy.233 The CAP Act would regulate the 
NCAA and its members’ athletic departments under Congress’s 
commerce and spending powers, respectively. 
CONCLUSION 
The NCAA’s enforcement process has been the subject of criticism 
since the 1970s and it remains so today in the wake of the Penn State 
and University of Miami cases. Ironically, although the NCAA has 
restructured that process as recently as August 1, 2013, journalists, 
academics, and college sports executives continue to call for changes, 
going so far as to suggest that the Association outsource its 
enforcement function to a third party.234 This Article supports that 
suggestion and offers specific proposals, contained in the CAP Act, 
that seek to increase the fairness of the NCAA process to accused 
parties, just as the Association’s recent reforms aim to increase its 
efficiency and effectiveness. Enactment of the CAP Act proposals 
would finally make the legal protections in the NCAA enforcement 
process commensurate with the high stakes that process holds for 
accused parties. 
 
 
231 CAP Act, supra note 212, § 4(C). 
232 Potuto, supra note 193, at 3–4. 
233 Id. at 37. 
234 Thamel, supra note 4; see also Mandel, supra note 27. 
